In this article we present a lattice attack done on a NTRU-like scheme introduced by Verkhovsky in [1] . We show how, based on the relation between the public and private key, we can construct an attack which allows any passive adversary to decrypt the encrypted messages. We explain, step by step, how an attacker can construct an equivalent private key and guess what the original plaintext was. Our attack is efficient and provides good experimental results.
Introduction
Lattice-based cryptography has become a research topic more and more studied nowadays. It may offer a good alternative to cryptographic schemes based on classical number-theory problems (e.g. discrete logarithm, factorization) that are easily solved on quantum computers.
Lattices have proven to provide securely hard problems on which we can build cryptographic schemes but also good tools for cryptanalysis. There are several lattice attacks [2, 3] done on NTRU [4] . The main tool of these attacks is the LLL algorithm [5] . In order to overcome this, there are variants of NTRU which base their security on lattice hard problems [6] .
In this article we present a lattice attack done on a NTRU-like scheme introduced by Verkhovsky in [1] .
Based on the relation between the public and private key, we construct an attack which allows any passive adversary to decrypt the encrypted messages. Moreover, our attack is efficient and provides good experimental results.
Preliminaries
We present in this section the essential background in lattices and Gaussian integers and the algorithms we use in our attack.
Notation. We use small letters and capital letters, and , to denote vectors and matrices, respectively. Capital letters like are also used for Gaussian integers. In order to avoid confusion, we use the Gaussian integers in the following form 1 2 . We denote by 
Background
Given n linearly independent vectors 1 2 , a lattice is the set of all linear combinations of b i 's with integral coefficients:
. 
It makes sense to speak about orthogonal lattice only for non full-rank lattices, where . The lattice n m  L  has dimension and rank m . m n  One important tool in cryptanalysis, LLL algorithm [5] was published in 1982 and since then couple of schemes were broken [7] [8] [9] by using it. Several improvements that reduce its complexity appeared in [10, 11] . Given a basis of a lattice , the aim of the LLL algorithm is to provide a LLL reduced basis where the first vector gives an approximation of the shortest non-zero vector of , 
The norm of a Gaussian integer , denoted by R
 
N R , is defined as . The units of 
Double Moduli Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem introduced by Verkhovsky in [1] , for which we construct an attack, is described in this section. We assume an a priori agreed large integer . Apart from the value , which is an integer, all the other parameters and inputs are Gaussian integers. 
Encryption/Decryption Algorithms
Algorithm 3.1 presents the steps followed by a participant with the aim of obtaining its public and private keys. The private key consists of two parts, P an , wh are relatively prime. Here, P is invertible modulo n . The public key, U , is obtaine by multiplying R with the inverse of P modulo n . , one has to pre-condition the plaintext so that it is a primary residue modulo , where is part of the private key. Since is not known to the sender, a threshold is imposed so that the inequalities from Definition 1 hold. The pre-conditioned plaintext must be selected such that the upper bound of the real and imaginary parts is U R W 6 n . The algorithms of pre-conditioning and recovery of a plaintext are described afterwards.
Algorithm 3.2 shows how to encrypt a pre-conditioned plaintext W . Besides the public key U , the sender chooses periodically a new value
After hiding the value of the public key, by multiplying it with , the ciphertext is obtained by adding this new value to the plaintext.
S
After receiving the ciphertext and provided that it has the correct private keys, the receiver is able to decrypt the message by following the steps from Algorithm 3.3. After the first step of the algorithm the receiver will compute as D PW RS  . In the second step, he is able to compute as the inverse of modulo , as and were chosen such that they are relatively prime. Finally, in the last step, the pre-conditioned plaintext is 
such that the constraints are respected. Input: Encryption , large integer .
obtained. Afterwards, the receiver will run the algorithm of plaintext recovery, algorithm illustrated later.
Plaintext Pre-Conditioning
As aforementioned, the plaintext is pre-conditioned before being encrypted. Similarly, a plaintext recovery algorithm is necessary in order to obtain the original message after decryption. These two transformations are illustrated in Algorithms 3.4 and 3.5. As must be a primary residue modulo the sender must ensure that the original plaintext W , R M is split into blocks of appropriate sizes.
Using LLL to Break the Scheme
This section presents our lattice attack. We prove that the double moduli scheme is insecure as any passive adversary that observes the encrypted messages can decrypt them with a non-negligible probability. 
Lattice Attack
An attacker is a probabilistic algorithm which runs in polynomial time. From Algorithm 3.1 an attacker can observe the following relation between , and namely
. Using this relation he is able to obtain an equivalent private key. This equivalent key is not necessary the private key   , P R , but can be used to decrypt correctly the encrypted message. We write the aforementioned relation for the imaginary and real parts and separate the known parts from those unknown. We obtain the following equation: 
With the design constraints of the scheme where both components of the private key are of size n and the public key is of size , both and should be of size
are linearly independent and are also orthogonal. The following lemma proves that the experiment works correctly: given the ciphertext and the public key, the attacker is able to obtain an equivalent private C Algorithm 4.1. Decrypting C with an equivalent private key (P′, R′).
, . 
x We can bound the value of from equality
N x  which gives us possibilities for 13 x . R , Using the last that equality and com  we obtain 
Experimental Results
The experiments were done on an INTEL Q9550 2.83 GHz processor, running a 32-bit version of Windows 7. The im the scheme was respected as it is described in perimental result ascertains that the doublemoduli cryptosystem fro [1] is in ecure.
Conclusion
In this article we have presented a lattice attack done on a NTRU-like scheme. The main tool is the LLL algorithm used on the orthogonal lattice. Our attack i gives good results guess correctly th broke the scheme.
